Abstract-In this paper, we study channel-based authentication, where the receiver can identify and authenticate the senders through channel vectors estimated from their frames. The authentication process is formulated as a sequence of hypothesis test problems. In order to improve the detection probability and reduce the false alarm probability, two schemes are proposed based on different classification algorithms in machine learning. Specifically, support vector machine (SVM) based authentication schemes and the linear Fisher discriminant analysis (LFDA) based authentication scheme are proposed by exploiting three channel features, including the time-of-arrivals, received signal strengths, and cyclic-features of the channels. In SVM based schemes, the linear and nonlinear SVMs are used to generate classifiers to solve the hypothesis test problems. In LFDA based scheme, a linear combination of these three channel features is used as the test statistic, which is compared with a threshold to perform authentication. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed schemes perform better in terms of the misdetection probability and the false alarm probability than several existing typical channel-based authentication schemes. Moreover, the time complexity and space complexity of the proposed schemes are analyzed, and the LFDA based scheme performs the best.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security is of paramount importance for wireless networks due to the broadcast nature of wireless communications. Traditionally, the security of wireless networks is addressed by cryptographic protocols above the physical layer [1] . However, for devices with limited computational and bandwidth resources or for a network without infrastructure, it is complex to implement the cryptography [2] , [3] . As a complement, physical layer security has drawn more and more attentions in the research community, which exploits the characteristic of the physical layer to provide security. Note that the physical layer security can be combined with the upper layer security techniques to provide higher security level.
In physical layer security, various research topics have been investigated, including secrecy capacity [4] , channel-based key generation [5] , and authentication [6] . In this paper, our focus is on physical layer authentication, which exploits the uniqueness of wireless channels to provide the entity authentication and data origin authentication. It can effectively combat the identity-based attacks (such as spoofing attacks), which malicious users can easily launch by faking the media access control (MAC) address or Internet Protocol (IP) address. Traditional cryptography-based authentication can combat these attacks. However, it may not be efficient or suitable for some scenarios. For example, existing 802.11 security techniques only provide authentication for data frames, but not for control frames [7] . Moreover, it is ill suited for a less equipped distributed wireless networks, where nodes join and leave frequently [7] . Compared with the traditional authentication, physical layer authentication is more efficient in terms of authentication speed and computation overhead to authenticate each message, which is more suitable for the scenarios where the devices have limited communication and computational capacities, such as smart grid [8] and body area networks [9] .
In the literature, physical layer authentication techniques can be classified into three main categories: hardware-based [7] , embedding waveforms [10] , and channel based [6] [11] . This paper focuses on channel-based authentication, which utilizes channel characteristics to authenticate the sender. There is a flurry of research activities in this area [6] [11] [12] [13] . Based on the difference among noise-mitigated channel impulse responses, a new test statistic is introduced for authentication in fading environments [6] . In [11] , the authors propose an authentication scheme based on NeymanPearson hypothesis test (NPHT). In [12] , two schemes are proposed by using refined multiple tone signature (RMTS) and complex temporal signature (CTS), respectively. RMTS in fact is the correlation coefficient between the frequency-domain channel vectors, while CTS takes the phase shift into the consideration. In [13] , two binary hypothesis test approaches using time-domain training-based channel impulse responses are proposed.
In this paper, we study channel-based authentication to enhance security using machine learning. The authentication problem is formulated as a sequence of hypothesis test problems. Specifically, support vector machine (SVM) based authentication schemes and the linear Fisher discriminant analysis (LFDA) based authentication scheme are proposed by exploiting the time-of-arrivals, received signal strengths, and cyclic-features of the channels. Different from the existing works where some statistic characteristics of the channels are already assumed to be known when the test statistics are designed and the underlying complex channel is assumed to be a stationary, zero-mean, Gaussian random process in [13] , the proposed schemes improve the detection probability and false alarm probability through training. Based on the training data set, the proposed schemes can be applied in various kinds of environments. Simulation results are provided to evaluate the proposed schemes in terms of the misdetection probability and the false alarm probability. Additionaly, the time complexity and space complexity of the proposed schemes are analyzed.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The system model and the problem formulation are given in Section II. The proposed two approaches are presented in Sections IV and We have the following assumptions, which are common in the literature of the physical layer authenticaion [11] [14] . These assumptions are supported by the well-known Jakes uniform scattering model [15] , which states that the signal rapidly de-correlates over a distance of roughly half a wavelength, and that spatial separation of one to two wavelengths is sufficient for assuming independent fading paths [14] . Based on these assumptions above, the main objective of the channel-based authentication is to distinguish the channel vectors from Alice to Bob hA and the channel vectors from Eve to Bob hE.
• Eve cannot measure or create or precisely model the channels between Alice and Bob, which means Eve cannot mimic the legitimate channels to masquerade Alice. This assumption always holds when Bob and Eve are located in spatially separated positions, especially when they are a wavelength away form the Eve in a richly scattered multi-path environment (typical of indoor wireless environments) [14] . • Alice's channel is different from Eve's channel. Take the indoor WiFi scenario for example. If Alice is more than 12.5cm away from Eve, which is larger than the WiFi wavelength, the channel from Alice to Bob and the channel from Eve to Bob are totally different.
• Channels for two successive frames from Alice are nearly the same [11] [13] . This assumption always holds, especially when there are no dynamic movements of Bob and Alice. For example, in the indoor WiFi scenario, where the human speed is about 1mis, and the physical layer frame duration is about 3.5 ms. During this duration, the movement of Alice is about 3.5mm, which is less than the WiFi wavelength.
B. Problem Formulation
Based on the three assumptions above, we formulate the channel-based authentication process as a sequence of hypothesis test problems as in [16] . The first hypothesis test problem is given by Figure 1 . System model V, respectively. Simulation results and analysis are provided in Section VI, followed by the conclusion in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION

A. System Model
The system model, as shown in Figure 1 , consists of three different parties: Alice, Bob, and Eve. Alice and Bob are both legitimate users, while Eve is a malicious user. Alice is transmitting frames to Bob. However, Eve tries to masquerade Alice and send frames to Bob. Bob has to authenticate the coming frames. That is, Bob has to determine whether the incoming frames are from the legitimate user, Le. Alice, according to the channels estimated. Channels are widely sampled and estimated in deployed wireless communication networks to demodulate the received signal. We name the vector of samples of time-domain channel impulse response (amplitude delay profile) sampled from one frame a channel vector. We assume that Bob first estimates and stores the channel vector from Alice to him as the shared secret at the beginning of the authentication process. Let hA denote the stored channel vector, which can be represented as follows:
where the subscript A denotes "the channel is from Alice", and M denotes the number of samples sampled uniformly per frame.
When one frame is received, Bob estimates the channel ht(k) from this frame as follows:
where the subscript t denotes "transmitter to be identified and authenticated" and k (k == 1,2, ... ) denotes the frame index.
Bob needs to determine whether the first frame is from Alice or not according to h t (1) and hA .
If Bob determines that the first frame is from Alice, Bob should keep authenticating the second frame using the channel vector estimated in the first frame and the channel vector estimated in the second frame. That is, Bob determines whether the second frame is from Alice or not according to h t (1) and h t (2) . Otherwise, an alarm should be given out. Also, he needs
C. Correlation of Cyclic Feature Vectors
In this subsection, how to compute the correlation of cyclic feature vectors is introduced. Let HA(Z) and Ht(z) denote the z-transforms of h A and h t , respectively, which can be given as follows:
III. SIMILARITY FEATURE VECTOR
We need some features to measure the "similarity" between any pair of channel vectors (h t and h A ). These features can be used to construct the test statistic to solve (6) , which is addressed in the following sections. If the "similarity" is high, we accept 1-l 0 in (6) . Otherwise, we reject 1-l 0 . (12) St("z) == Ht(z*)H t (z-l e j r ) (13) where Yi == -1 means that Xi belongs to class -1.
Each similarity feature vector Xi is a 3-dimensional point of the form as follows:
of cyclostationary signals [21] . SA (" z) and St (" z) can be given as follows:
In the following sections, we use Ai, f3i and ()i computed from hi and h i -1 to construct the similarity feature vector Xi in (15) to measure the "similarity" between any pair of channel vectors hi and hi-1.
IV. SUPPORT VECTOR MACHINE BASED AUTHENTICATION SCHEMES
In this section, we use two-class SVMs to devise two different classification algorithms to solve the problem in (6) . There are two classes of similarity feature vectors in our case. The first class (class -1) is the set of similarity feature vectors with high similarity and the other class (class + 1) is the set of similarity feature vectors with low similarity. A set of data sets are used to train SVMs, which output linear or nonlinear classifiers to distinguish the similarity feature vectors of two classes. If a new similarity feature vector is classified to class -1 by the outputted linear or nonlinear classifier, 1-l0 is accepted. Otherwise, 1-l 1 is accepted. In the following, how to compute the classifier based on the training data set is explained.
The training data set D tT with ItT similarity feature vectors is given by where * denotes conjugate operation, and j denotes unit imaginary number.
Sample the, -z plane and gain the feature matrix of channels. For example, when z == e j~n (n == 0,1,· .. ,N -1) and , ==~q (q == 0,1, ... ,Q -1), we can get an N x Q matrix.
To reduce the complexity, we can just use the information at several cyclic-frequencies. For example, pick up P cyclic frequencies from the set {, ==~q : q == 0,1, ... ,Q -I} and compute an N x P matrix. We name this kind of matrixes as the cyclic feature matrix of channels and reshape them into a cyclic feature vector. Let SA(q, n) and St(q, n) denote the cyclic feature vectors of hA and h t . A is defined as the absolute value of the correlation of the cyclic feature vectors.
A == abs(CycCorr(ii t , ii A ))
= abs( II~t(q,n) §A~q,n)HII ) (14) IISt(q, n)IIIISA(q, n)11
In summary, the channel-based authentication can be formulated into a general hypothesis problem: given a channel vector between legitimate users hA (i - In order to make the setting of thresholds easier, we do some transformation on RSS. f3 is defined as following:
max(RSS(h t ), RSS(hA))
B. TOA
Time of arrival (TOA) is the travel time of a radio signal from the transmitter to the remote receiver. TOA can be used in localization [19] and physical-layer authentication [20] . We can use TOA as a feature to do authentication.
In order to make the setting of thresholds easier, we do some transformation on TO A. () is defined as following:
max(TOA(h t ), TOA(hA)) A. RSS
Received signal strength (RSS) is a measurement of the power received at the receiver. It reflects the length of the channel vector. RSS can be used in localization [17] and physical-layer authentication [18] , due to the existing relationship between RSS and the distance. RSS can be considered as the square of the length of channel vectors.
Define the, -z transforms SA("Z) and St("z) of hA and h t , respectively, which are similar to the cyclic spectrum Our goal is to find the maximum margin hyperplane that distinguishes these similarity feature vectors with Yi == +1 from those with Yi == -1. Any hyperplane can be written as the set of similarity feature vectors x satisfying: (25) JC(Xi, Xj) == ¢(Xi)T¢(Xj). The problem becomes: (18) w is recovered as w == LXiES aiYi¢(xi). For In this section, we solve the problem in (6) using linear FDA (LFDA). The proposed LFDA based authentication scheme is to construct a linear combination of (3, () 
The dual problem is given as follows:
where . denotes the dot product. If w T Xi +b < 0, Yi is labeled as 1. Otherwise Yi is labeled as -1. We can get the optimal separating hyperplane according to SVM theory by solving the following problem:
which is a quadratic programming (QP) problem. The support vectors are those points satisfying Yi (w
. S is the set of the support vectors [22] . We can get the optimal separating hyperplane from the following equations: (28) (29) (26) (30) (31) (27) WLFDA == arg max w :J(w)
IDE,trl XiEDE,tr
Sw can be estimated as follows
xiEDA,tr
According to [25] , WLFDA can be computed according to the following equation:
where mo is the mean of all the Xi in DA,tr, and ml is the mean of all the Xi in DE,tr. DE,tr and DA,tr are two classes (class + 1 and class -1) in D tr . mo and ml are given in as follows:
In summary, the proposed LFDA based authentication scheme is to construct a linear combination of (3i, ()i, and Ai. The linear FDA and D tr are used to determine the weights.
HI
== wO(3i + WI Ai + W2()i~th 11, 0 The existing LFDA algorithm can be used to find a linear coefficient vector WLFDA and assign a higher linear coefficient to a more significant feature [18] . Let SB and Sw denote the between-and within-class scatter matrices respectively [25] . WLFDA can be gained by maximizing the Rayleigh coefficient :J(w) == ::;%:~with respect to w [26] , which is formulated as follows: Nonlinear SVMs can be used by aid of some "kernel tricks" [24] . Assume that the kernel function is defined by where II here denotes the number of elements in the set.
For authenticating a new similarity feature vector Z, if
Otherwise, 11,1 is accepted. In fact, the training data are always not separable. If "error" ei is allowed, we need to solve the following problem:
here ei is the "slack variables" in optimization [23] , ei ==°m eans that there is no error for Xi, and C is the tradeoff parameters between error and margin.
The dual program is VI. RESULTS
A. Simulation Results
To evaluate the performance of our proposed schemes we use the measured channel impulse response data set from Utah University [12] . The measurement was done in a 14 by 13 meters regular office with many small cubes. There are 44 locations in this office, as shown in Figure 2 . The small circles in Figure 2 
B. Complexity Analysis
Let J denote the dimension of the similarity feature vectors. The computation of each similarity feature vector involves the During each round of simulation, the detection probability and false alarm probability are plotted in Figure 3 . From Figure 3 , polynomial SVMs are better than quadratic SVMs, which are better than linear SVMs. Moreover, the SVM based schemes have better performance than NPHT in terms of misdetection probability and false alarm probability. SVMs can provide the weights and threshold at the same time, while most existing schemes do not consider how to compute or set the threshold.
In addition, we use D tr to compute WLPDA according to (28) , (29), (30) and (31) . Then we vary the threshold th to plot ROC curve of our LFDA. We compare it with the NPHT scheme in [14] . In Figure 3 , it is shown that the performance of our proposed schemes is better than NPHT. When Pp is 1%, P D of NPHT is 70%, and P D of LFDA based scheme is extremely close to 95%. When Pp is 8%, P D of LFDA based scheme is 99.97%. [29] [30]. The complexity comparison of these schemes during the training stage is shown in Table I . In order to get the average The eXIstIng NPHT scheme involves N-point FFf computation and a minimization problem. Its complexity is O (Nlog 2 N) .
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the channel-based physical layer authentication. Several channel-based authentication schemes, including SVM based schemes and the LFDA based scheme, have been proposed to improve the detection probability and reduce the false alarm probability. Through simulations, the proposed scheme have better detection probabilities and false alarm probabilities than existing channel-based schemes. Moreover, the proposed schemes can be integrated with upper layer security techniques to provide authentication. For instance, the physical layer authentication can be leveraged to trigger the upper layer authentication mechanisms. If the user does not pass the physical layer authentication, it should be asked to provide upper layer credentials. Since the proposed scheme only needs the channel information, it is easy to implement without much modification of the existing system. Moreover, the proposed authentication scheme can be applied to any wireless network when the nodes have a relatively low mobility.
For our future work, we will study the physical layer authentication for the scenarios where nodes present high mobility features.
